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Recent Case
ARMED SERVICES

MILITARY JURISDICTION RESERVISTS

Wallace v. Chafee,
451 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1971).
The inferiority of military justice when compared with civilian
justice has long been recognized.' Courts-martial, because they have
traditionally been more concerned with discipline than justice, have
tended to be more retribution-oriented and "less favorable to defendants" than civilian criminal courts. 2 Equally important, courtmartialed servicemen are not given the full constitutional protection
of the Bill of Rights.8 At a minimum, a member of the armed
forces cannot claim the protection of the fifth amendment right to
grand jury indictment 4 or the sixth amendment right to a trial by a
1See, e.g., Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955), which commented that "military tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such way that
they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts."
2
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258,265-66 (1969).
3It is not entirely clear whether a serviceman's rights stem from the Bill of Rights
or from the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970) (hereinafter cited as UCMJ]. Henderson, Courts-Martialand the Constitution: The Original
Understanding,71 HARv. L. REV. 293 (1957).
The UCMJ was enacted in 1950 pursuant to Congress' power "[t]o make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
Today, the question of which of these sources provides the rights of servicemen is of
diminished practical consequence because many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
are specifically set forth in the UCMJ. These rights include the right to appointed
counsel before special and general courts-martial (10 U.S.C. § 827 (1970)), the right
against self-incrimination (10 U.S.C. § 831 (1970) ), and the right to have illegally
obtained evidence excluded at trial (10 U.S.C. § 837 (1970); see In re Meader, 60
F. Supp. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1945) ). Moreover, the United States Court of Military Appeals
has applied Supreme Court interpretations of the Bill of Rights in military cases applying corresponding UCMJ provisions. See, e.g., United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A.
629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967); United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R.
244 (1960).
While the serviceman's rights may in fact be the same regardless of their source, the
security afforded by an act of legislative grace cannot compare with that accorded by the
Bill of Rights, which protection could never be withdrawn.
4 The pretrial procedure and charging process for a serviceman does not include a
right to a grand jury indictment. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 830-35 (1970). The fifth amendment expressly negates this right in "cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger." Thus, although the
fifth amendment exception is not applicable in cases that do not arise in time of war or
public danger, the UCMJ's general abrogation of this right is nonetheless applicable.
The fifth amendment right to grand jury indictment has not been held to be absolute
in either federal or state prosecutions. Indeed, the right to such an indictment has not
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jury of his peers. 5 Since this loss of fundamental rights occurs whenever court-martial jurisdiction is exercised, the Supreme Court has
narrowly circumscribed that jurisdiction.6
Applying court-martial jurisdiction under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) to reservists on inactive duty training raises
particularly vexatious problems, for these persons are "soldiers" only
during training sessions and are otherwise civilians. Court-martial
jurisdiction over these reservists is clearly provided for by article
2(3) of the UCMJ, 7 subject to the one precondition that the reservist must voluntarily accept UCMJ jurisdiction. Because of the
serious consequences that accompany a loss of one's constitutional
rights, any exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over reservists, it
seems, should at least be tempered by a clear showing in each case
that the reservist actually knew that he was consenting to UCMJ
jurisdiction and was aware of the import of his consent. A failure to
accord reservists such protection, however, may be presaged by the
recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Wallace v. Cha8
fee.
Appellee, James M. Wallace, a private first class in the Marine
Corps Reserve, was convicted by summary court-martial9 for willful
been incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), and only exists in federal criminal prosecutions where
the crime carries a penalty of greater than one year in prison. FED. R. CRIM.P. 7.
5Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), held that, if an offense could be punished by greater than six month's imprisonment, a civilian court, at least, was constitutionally required to provide a trial by jury. In the present case of Wallace v. Chafee,
451 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1971), Wallace had been charged with disobeying a superior
officer
in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1970), which, under 10 U.S.C. § 856 (1970), is:
punishable by confinement at hard labor for a term of five years. Thus, Wallace would.
have had the right to trial by jury if he had been tried in a state court.
6See notes 36-47 infra & accompanying text.
7 10 U.S.C. § 802(3) (1970). Article 2(3) makes subject to the UCMJ "[members.
of a reserve component while they are on inactive duty training authorized by written
orders which are voluntarily accepted by them and which specify that they are subject
to (the UCMJJ."
8451 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1971). Wallace is apparently the first case dealing expressly, albeit summarily, with the validity of court-martial jurisdiction over reservists
on inactive duty training under article 2(3). In United States v. Schuering, 16
U.S.C.LA. 324, 36 C.M.R. 480 (1966), the defendant-reservist was convicted for larceny committed while he was on inactive duty training. The United States Court of
Military Appeals, in reversing the conviction because jurisdictional requirements had not
been met, impliedly upheld court-martial jurisdiction over reservists under article 2 (3).
See also In re La Plata's Petition, 174 F. Supp. 884 (ED. Mich. 1959); In re Taylor, 160
F. Supp. 932 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
9 The UCMJ provides for general, special, and summary courts-martial. 10 U.S.C
§ 816 (1970). Each courtes jurisdiction is limited primarily by the maximum punishment that can be imposed. Summary courts-martial may adjudge any punishment except death, dismissal, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, confinement for greater
than one month, hard labor without confinement for greater than 45 days, restriction to
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disobedience of the order of a superior commissioned officer to get a
haircut." Wallace had completed the enlistment procedure and had
acknowledged in writing his acceptance of orders subjecting himself to UCMJ jurisdiction." At no time prior to enlistment and acceptance of his orders, however, was he given specific information
concerning the UCMJ or court-martial jurisdiction. The district
court granted Wallace a writ of habeas corpus - on the ground that
Wallace had not voluntarily consented to UCMJ jurisdiction consistent with article 2(3)1" - but was reversed by the court of appeals.
The court of appeals agreed with the lower court that the right
to civilian trial with its attendant safeguards is a fundamental right' 3
and recognized that voluntary acceptance of UCMJ jurisdiction is
statutorily required for that jurisdiction to attach.' 4 The court of
appeals, however, applied a different standard than the district court
to ascertain whether Wallace had in fact accepted voluntarily. The
district court applied the Johnson v. Zerbst'5 standard (i.e., the
specified limits for more than two months or forfeiture of more than two-thirds of one
month's pay. 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1970). A similar restriction applies to special courtsmartial, limiting their jurisdiction to cases authorizing confinement for greater than six
months and hard labor without confinement for greater than three months. 10 U.S.C.
§ 819 (1970). General courts-martial have jurisdiction over cases with all punishments.
10 U.S.C. § 818 (1970). See note 3 supra.
If a commanding officer utilizes his nonjudicial power of punishment, an objection
thereto before the imposition of such punishment necessitates an adjudication before a
court-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970). However, in no event may one be brought
before a summary court-martial without his consent. 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1970). Thus,
the UCMJ protects the accused's right to counsel since the right only exists in special
and general courts-martial. Application of Palacio, 48 Cal. Rptr. 50, 238 Cal. App.2d
545 (1965).
10 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1970).
11These orders, tendered pursuant to 32 C.F.R. § 713.607 (1971), provided:
During the actual performance of regular drills, periods of equivalent instruction of duty, and annual training pursuant to this order, you are subject
to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Upon acceptance by you of these
orders you will be subject to the code during periods of inactive duty training performed which are the same or an interrupted continuation of the training contemplated by these orders.
12 Wallace v. Chafee, 323 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
13451 F.2d at 1377.
14 Id.
15 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Johnson was a civilian habeas corpus case. The Supreme
-Court granted the writ because the petitioner had been denied counsel at his trial in a
federal district court without a valid waiver.
Courts have applied the Johnson "knowing and intelligent waiver" standard often,
in order to ensure that fundamental rights have been voluntarily waived. See, e.g.,
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (guilty plea as waiver of constitutionally protected trial rights); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (self-incrimination and counsel).
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"intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege" standard) to evaluate the validity of Wallace's waiver
of his fundamental rights.' 6 The Ninth Circuit held there was no
need to apply the Johnson standard because enlistment in the reserves is purely voluntary, whereas the right to counsel dealt with
in Johnson is related to a trial proceeding which has been thrust
upon the defendant. 1 Instead, the court concluded that
it should be sufficient if the contract -law standards of notice and
volitional act are met [in the enlistment situation]. One who enters a contract is on notice of the provisions of the contract. If he
assents voluntarily to those provisions after notice, he should be
presumed, in the absence of ambiguity, to have8 understood and
agreed to comply with the provisions as written.
In reversing the district court, the court of appeals held that such
standards had been met in Wallace.
The appellate court's statement is in accord with the general
principle of contract law that, in the absence of fraud, one who does
not choose to read a contract before signing it cannot later relieve
himself of its burdens. Many courts of late, however, have tempered this basic tenet of freedom of contract with equitable notions
where the contracting parties occupy positions of unequal bargaining power.'" At a minimum, these courts have protected the offeree in an inferior bargaining position by requiring that he be put
on notice and made aware of important rights which he is about to
20sign away.
21
Enlistment has long been viewed as a contractual relationship,
16 323 F. Supp. at 904.
17451 F.2d at 1377.
18 Id.

19 Before a court applies the often stated rule that one who signs a written contract is bound by its provisions whether he was aware of them or not, it should
carefully consider the facts of the case with respect to the form in which the
provisions appear on the document, to the manner in which they were (or
were not) called to the attention of the signer, to the characterof the provision
as one that the signer had reason to expect to be contained in the writing,
and to the relative positions of the parties in the bargaining process. 1 A.
CORBIN, CONTRA
MS § 128 (1963) (emphasis added).
20
The waiver cannot be hidden among other provisions in the contract. See, e.g.,
Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos., 48 N.J. 291, 225 A.2d 328 (1966); Cutler Corp. v.
Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953).
21 See, e.g., In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
Although the orders subjecting Wallace to court-martial jurisdiction were signed

prior to his taking the oath of enlistment, both the district court, 323 F. Supp. at 903, and
the court of appeals, 451 F.2d at 1378-79, rejected arguments that military status was required before one could be bound by orders accepted, viewing the enlistment process as
a single, integrated transaction. Even if the signing of the orders were not viewed in
this way, the signing would still be effective as a contract to take effect upon the occur-
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and the court of appeals could have justifiably applied these equitable principles to the enlistment process. But instead, the court
concluded that sufficient notice of court-martial jurisdiction was provided by a statement in the orders Wallace acceded to during the
enlistment process, to the effect that he would be subject to the
UCMJ 2 In arriving at this conclusion, the court held that the
burden of inquiry was on the prospective enlistee and, in the absence
of any inquiry by Wallace, he was deemed to have understood the
document he signed. 3
Unfortunately, this approach to Wallace's case is inconsistent
with anything but a wholly fictitious view of the circumstances under which the enlistment papers were signed. First of all, because
the enlistment document made no explicit reference to court-martial
jurisdiction, the adequacy of notice is questionable under any view of
contract law.24 Notice was especially hampered in this case because
the orders subjecting Wallace to UCMJ jurisdiction were immersed
in a "sea of forms" signed incident to enlistment. 25 And secondly,
Wallace occupied a distinctly inferior bargaining position vis-a-vis
the military, and it was the military which provided the terms of the
enlistment contract.2 6 Only if the court of appeals had more closely
scrutinized the enlistment process and taken account of these factors, could there have been realistic protection of Wallace's rights.
rence of a condition precedent, enlistment. Either way, equitable contract principles are
applicable.
22 451 F.2d at 1377. There was no reference to court-martial jurisdiction per se in
the document signed by Wallace. There was only a statement indicating that he would
be subject to the UCMJ.
23 Id.
24 See note 22 supra. See also Riverdale Fabrics Corp. v. Tillinghast-Stiles Co., 306
N.Y. 288, 118 N.E.2d 104 (1954).
25 323 F. Supp. at 904.
26 Although Wallace's enlistment was a volitional act, as the court points out, 451
F.2d at 1377, it must be remembered that the alternative to enlistment in the reserves
is remaining eligible for the draft. In light of this, and since acceptance of the orders
was a precondition to enlistment, the prospective enlistee is not realistically in a position to object to the requirements imposed by the military for entry into the reserves
even were he to know and understand them. This situation, which furthers the inequality of the parties' bargaining positions, is another factor weighing in favor of applying the equitable contract approach to the enlistment process.
27 The contract approach taken by the court of appeals is also questionable in light
of the statutory language of article 2(3). As noted by the court, 451 F.2d at 1377, article 2(3) is the only one of the 12 jurisdictional provisions of the UCMJ which expressly
makes such jurisdiction dependent upon voluntary submission. See 10 U.S.C. § 802
(1970). Because the court of appeals applied a pure freedom of contract standard, it
afforded Wallace no more protection than he would have received had there been no requirement that his acceptance of orders be voluntary. In effect, then, the court has completely read the voluntariness requirement out of article 2(3). See also 323 F. Supp.
at 904.
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Because the fundamental rights to grand jury indictment and
trial by jury are lost in the court-martial process, Johnson v. Zerbst,
as well as equitable contract doctrines, should have provided adequate legal grounds in Wallace to require that a valid forfeiture be
made with actual knowledge.2 8 The court of appeals' refusal to
apply Johnson, simply because the waiver occurred in a context unrelated to trial, hinges on a tenuous distinction. While it is true
that the enlistee in the reserves voluntarily enters the service, this
should not be permitted to spread a contagion of voluntariness regarding the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, absent a
clear showing that the waiver was made with actual knowledge.
Were Wallace a civilian, a purported waiver of his right to grand
jury indictment"9 or jury trial3 would not be given effect unless the
Johnson standard were satisfied. There is no valid reason for not
applying a test of equal stringency when the waiver of the same
rights occurs in the enlistment process.3 1 In fact, because the enlistee is far less "on guard" about the import of waiving his constiThe Ninth Circuit's treatment of some of the legislative history is also questionable. An analysis of the legislative history of article 2(3) seems to indicate that UCMJ
jurisdiction was intended to cover a reservist on inactive duty training only if he were
using dangerous or expensive equipment. See S. REP. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
8 (1949); H.R. REP. No. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 860 (1949). See generally Gerwig, Court-MartialJurirdictionOver Weekend Reservists, 44 MiL. L. EY. 123, 127-28
(1969). The court peremptorily dismissed this question.
28
See, e.g., Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Cos., 48 N.J. 291, 225 A.2d 328 (1966);
Kar v. H & M Parcel Room, 270 App. Div. 538, 61 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1946), aff'd
296 N.Y. 1044, 73 N.E.2d 912 (1947). Were the provision itself unconscionable,
as was the disclaimer of warranty in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 NJ. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960), making the clause dearer and more conspicuous would not suffice to satisfy equitable contract doctrines and validate the waiver. Nothing is per se
unconscionable, however, about permitting an individual to waive his right to grand
jury indictment or his right to jury trial. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276,
312 (1930) (jury trial); Turner v. United States, 325 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 946 (1964) (grand jury indictment). A dearly worded, conspicuous waiver,
therefore, may suffice to give adequate notice and satisfy equitable contract law. But
the better view of the equitable contract standard, Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 4,
97 A.2d 234, 236 (1953), as well as the Johnson standard, would require that the enlistee be specifically told that subjecting himself to the UCMJ would entail the loss of
fundamental rights.
29 See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 325 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
946 (1964).
30
See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Dranow v. United States,
325 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1963).
31 The district court extended the requirement that court-martial jurisdiction be
voluntarily accepted by reservists to include the right of the reservist to revoke his consent at any time after he has enlisted. However, such a holding is not supported by
the legislative history of article 2(3). 451 F.2d at 1377-78. Nor is the district court's
holding mandated by either the Johnson test or contract law.
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tutional trial rights than would be a defendant in a criminal trial,
arguably he should be protected by an even more stringent standard.
By not adopting such a test of voluntariness, the court of appeals
failed to adequately protect the constitutional rights Wallace enjoyed
prior to becoming a reservist.3 2 Moreover, the court glossed over
the more fundamental question of whether, in light of recent Supreme Court holdings that constitutionally restrict court-martial jurisdiction, such jurisdiction can ever be validly applied to reservists.
And in a related vein, even assuming the validity of extending courtmartial jurisdiction to reservists, the court of appeals completely
failed to assess the possible impact of these same Supreme Court
cases in determining the elements of a "voluntary" acceptance of
jurisdiction.
The Ninth Circuit's view that a reservist on inactive duty training can be constitutionally subjected to UCMJ jurisdiction may appear
correct at first blush, on the theory that he is a "serviceman," but it
does not recognize the fundamental difference between a reservist
and a "soldier." Although a reservist may be labeled "soldier" two
days a month, he is essentially a civilian. This distinction and the
problem it poses concerning the relation of the UCMJ to reservists
on inactive duty training has been recognized by at least one judge
on the United States Court of Military Appeals. Judge Ferguson
noted in his concurring opinion in United States v. Schuering3
the troublesome question of exercise of the power to try ordinary

citizens by courts-martial on the basis of their tenuous connection
with the armed forces through membership in the reserve forces
and attendance at inactive duty training drills. Such an extraordinary exercise of military judicial authority over our modern day
militiamen bears the closest examination - even from the constitutional standpoint - particularly when the civil courts are open and
functioning throughout the Nation with the authority to punish all
who transgress its laws, reservist or no. 34

Although Schuering dealt with the applicability of article 3 (a) of
the UCMJ to reservists, Judge Ferguson's admonition applies equally
in relation to article 2(3).3 5
32 See notes 3-5 supra & accompanying text.
33 16 U.S.C.M.A. 324, 36 C.M.R. 480 (1966).
34 Id. at 331-32, 36 C.M.R. at 487-88 (Ferguson, J., concurring).
35 10 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1970). The reasoning of the court in Schuering demonstrates the confused results which can occur with respect to UCMJ jurisdiction over reservists on inactive duty training. The Court of Military Appeals noted that, for military jurisdiction to attach, the accused reservist must be subject to military law (i.e., on
inactive or active duty) both at the time of the commission of the offense and at the
time of trial. The court, therefore, reversed a court-martial conviction, holding that
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Were military justice the equivalent of civilian justice, any question as to whether court-martial jurisdiction can apply would have
little practical consequence. But because there are serious differences,
several Supreme Court cases have consistently construed military jurisdiction as narrowly as possible. A careful examination of these
cases supports the view that reservists on inactive duty training
should not be subject to the UCMJ at all - or, at a minimum, their
acceptance of such jurisdiction should be effective only when truly
voluntary.
The first case which narrowed the jurisdiction of the UCMJ was
United States ex rel. Toth v.Quarles,3 6 in which article 3 (a) of the
UCMJ (which provided for court-martial jurisdiction over ex-servicemen) 37 was held invalid as applied to civilian veterans. The Court
reasoned that Congress could constitutionally subject only members
of "the land and naval [f]orces," as provided in article I, section 8,
to court-martial jurisdiction. Veterans, once they become civilians,
could not be tried by military courts simply because they were subject to the UCMJ when the crime was committed. Toth was thus
the first case to require serviceman status as a prerequisite to military jurisdiction.
The Toth rule was extended in Reid v. Covet 8 when the Court
held that, as a matter of constitutional law, civilian dependents who
committed capital crimes while accompanying servicemen overseas
could not be subjected to UCMJ jurisdiction. Reid dealt with article 2(11) of the UCMJ which applied court-martial jurisdiction to
"all persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed
forces without the continental limits of the United States.13 9 Extending the civilian-serviceman status test of jurisdiction initiated
in Toth, the plurality noted that a civilian does not lose his civilian
status merely by accompanying the military abroad.4" This view was
soon extended by the Court to noncapital offenses committed by
there was no jurisdiction because the trial was not held during a regularly scheduled
drill. This situation demonstrates the problem inherent in attempting to attach military jurisdiction to an individual who is subject to such jurisdiction only two days a
month. 16 U.S.CM.A. at 327, 329, 36 C.M.R. at 483, 485.
36350 U.S. 11 (1955).
37 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1970). This article provides that a person who committed
certain offenses while subject to the code is not "relieved from amenability to trial by
court-martial by reason of the termination of that status."
38354 U.S. 1 (1957).

39 Act of May 5,1950, ch. 169, art. 2, § 11, 64 Star. 108 [now 10 U.S.C. § 802(11)
(1970)].
40 354 U.S. at 23.
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civilian dependents accompanying the armed forces abroad, 4' and to
capital42 and noncapital43 offenses committed by civilian employees
of the military overseas.
More recently, the Court elaborated on the status test of jurisdiction in O'Callahan v. Parker.44 The Court, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Douglas, held that " '[s~tatus' [as a serviceman] is necessary
for [court-martial] jurisdiction; but it does not follow that ascertainment of 'status' completes the inquiry, regardless of the nature, time,
and place of the offense." 45 In O'Callahan a soldier was convicted
of attempted rape, housebreaking and assault with intent to commit
rape. But the Court recognized the shortcomings and inadequacies
of military justice, particularly the absence of grand jury indictment
and jury trial, and held that UCMJ jurisdiction could not constitutionally be invoked because the victim was unaffiliated with the military and the crimes were committed while the soldier was off post,
on pass and out of uniform. The Court concluded that, for a
crime to be under military jurisdiction [it] must be service connected, lest "cases arising in the land or naval forces . . ." as used
in the Fifth Amendment, be expanded to deprive every member of
the armed services of the benefits of an indictment by a grand jury
and a trial by a jury of his peers. The power of Congress to make
"Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces," . . . need not be sparingly read in order to preserve those
two important constitutional guarantees. For it is assumed that an
express grant of general power to Congress is to be exercised
in
harmony with express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 46
Thus, since O'Callahan, the UCMJ cannot apply even to fulltime soldiers in all situations. 4' The fact that non-service-connected
crimes committed by full-time servicemen are constitutionally excepted from court-martial jurisdiction, even though the status test
has been met, lends support to the position that crimes committed by
reservists on inactive duty training should also be excepted from
such jurisdiction, since their military connection is slight. But re41 Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
42 Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
43 McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
44 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
45 Id. at 267.
46 Id. at 262.
47 Id. at 272-73. While O'Callahanhas been limited in some respects by Relford v.
Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971), its rationale for the present purposes is still undiminished. The Relford facts were similar to O'Callahan'sexcept that in Reiford the
rape occurred on post and the victims were affiliated with the post. Relford exp!icitly
stated that it dealt only with O'Callahan'sfactual application and not its rationale. 401
U.S. at 360.
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gardless of the merits of this absolute position, the underlying
premise of the High Court's decisions - that court-martial jurisdiction is onerous and is invalid unless its propriety is clear - implies
that the voluntariness of a reservist's consent to military jurisdiction
should at least be tested by the highest standards. The court of
appeals, of course, applied no such standards.
In sum, both the reasoning and results in Wallace are
questionable. The court ignored several arguments that would have required
an opposite result and, in applying a restrictive view of contract law,
relied on an unrealistic characterization of the entire enlistment
process. To presume that the enlistee understands his important
waiver of rights in the typical enlistment process is, in effect, to peremptorily strip him of those rights. Without requiring the military
to explain the meaning of the waiver to an enlistee, he is not going
to glean that meaning from an isolated provision in the orders subjecting him to the UCMJ. For the future, the most important question raised by Wallace is whether the other circuits
and ultimately the Supreme Court - will arrive at conclusions similar to
the Ninth Circuit's. There are persuasive reasons, if not dearly
controlling reasons, for a contrary holding.
Y

